With Donald Trump back in the White House, will the United States be a credible, capable, and trustworthy ally? European and Canadian officials are reluctant to pose the question so bluntly. After all, the administration is in its early weeks, critical decisions lay ahead, and long-standing patterns of bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation, which were reinforced under President Biden, are not easily undone. Allies cannot appear to presume bad behavior by their most important partner without risking a counterproductive backlash.
Still, caution lights are flashing across multiple avenues of transatlantic defense critical to its strength and resilience.
Trump’s commitment to Ukraine in its existential struggle against Russia is far from certain. He quickly abandoned an unserious campaign promise to end the war “in 24 hours” and, for now, has stopped praising Vladimir Putin. Instead, he threatens tariffs and other sanctions on Russia to convince Putin to make a “quick deal.”
But given the unprecedented sanctions imposed by Biden’s administration – in close coordination with the EU, which Trump openly disdains – American experts doubt such threats will carry much weight with the Kremlin. Meanwhile, presidential advisors who once pilloried Russia for its brutal full-scale invasion now seem to think that a cease-fire in place and denying Ukraine any prospect of NATO membership would be part of a “realistic” settlement.
Kuva: Cnp / SipaUSA / Lehtikuva
One near-term indicator of the administration’s intentions will be its decision on whether and, if so, under what conditions additional US military assistance will flow to Ukraine. In his final months in office, Biden relaxed restrictions on Ukraine’s use of US missiles against military targets in Russia. He also expedited weapons deliveries and other security assistance to Kyiv, using the last of the $62 billion authorized by Congress since February 2022.
In contrast, Trump harshly criticized that assistance during his campaign, although after the election, he suggested it could be resumed at some level in exchange for US access to Ukrainian rare earth and other mineral deposits. He also denounced Ukrainian missile strikes in Russia as “escalating this war”—a statement that, according to a Kremlin spokesman, “completely coincides with our position.”
So far, the administration has maintained radio silence on what will be a main sticking point in any negotiations to stop the fighting: the nature of Western security guarantees to help Ukraine deter and defend against a renewed Russian attack. In particular, would American soldiers join other allies in a “coalition of the willing” peacekeeping force inside Ukraine? Ukraine insists on it, and most allies likely would, too. But Moscow recently ruled out any Western military presence.
Ukraine is part of a larger problem set involving the US role in NATO and US force presence in Europe. Many top national security officials who served in Trump’s first term — including his two Senate-confirmed defense secretaries, two of his four national security advisors, and his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — have publicly decried his willful lack of understanding of, and respect for, the Alliance.
Have Trump’s views fundamentally changed since then?
In fact, he told an interviewer in December 2024 that “war with Russia is more important for Europe than it is for us…We have a little thing called an ocean between us.” Such remarks raise legitimate questions about his grasp of the nature of Russia’s threat to Western security and US collective defense treaty obligations. (Fact check: The Bering Strait separates Alaska and Russia by only 85 km.)
Similarly, he repeated past misrepresentations regarding defense spending, claiming he got allies to put “hundreds of billions of dollars…into NATO” by telling them “I’m not going to protect you unless you pay.” Soon after his inauguration, he issued a new warning: he would “ask all NATO nations to increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP.” (The United States currently spends about 3 percent of its GDP on defense, while Finland spends about 2.4 percent.)
In 2023, Congress passed bipartisan legislation, which Biden signed into law, intended to prevent a president from withdrawing from NATO without the approval of two-thirds of the Senate or an act of Congress. But this would not be a foolproof firewall against a self-declared “disruptor” who is now commander-in-chief and prizes his own unpredictability.
Remember this: in June 2020, Trump ordered a cut in US troop strength in Germany from 36,000 to 24,000 within three months – reportedly with little or no advance consultation with Berlin. ”We don’t want to be the suckers anymore,” Trump told the press. ”We’re reducing the force because (the Germans) are not paying their bills; it’s very simple.” Biden rescinded Trump’s directive soon after his inauguration.
More recently, Trump’s menacing statements on acquiring Greenland — “We need it for international security. And I’m sure that Denmark will come along” — raise doubts about his respect for the sovereign rights and interests of US allies, not to mention their sacrifices in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Reports of Trump’s tense discussion in mid-January with Denmark’s Prime Minister are not encouraging.
Hopefully, Washington and Copenhagen will redirect their focus toward expanding cooperation with other allies and Greenland authorities to improve deterrence, defense, commercial ties, and environmental protections in the Arctic region. But Trump’s disservice to the Alliance and American allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific should not be underestimated. China and Russia can use his threats to take over Greenland (and Panama) to justify their designs on Taiwan and Ukraine.
Meanwhile, conflicts in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and elsewhere will test transatlantic solidarity in ways we cannot fully appreciate today. Case in point: Trump’s surprise announcement in February of US intent to “take over” Gaza and resettle its population elsewhere.
Finally, this White House’s particular “America First” and “transactional” mindset – combined with its retribution-fueled shakeup of national security structures, leadership, and staffing – could roil transatlantic cooperation in areas ranging from strategic planning, force posture and operations to information, intelligence, and technology sharing.
Over its 76 years, the Alliance has confronted many serious tensions between the United States and its allies. Ultimately, it remained strong because their differences did not override shared interests and values.
But will the past be prologue?
Writer
Leo Michel is a Non-resident Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and co-host of FIIA’s “Transatlantic Currents” webinar series. Michel retired from the US Government in 2015, after 35 years as a non-partisan, career civil servant in national security affairs.
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