Why Indo-Pacific security matters to Finland

Why should the Indo-Pacific matter to the security of Finland, on the other side of the world? It is a reasonable question, to be greeted with a healthy dose of Nordic scepticism. Finland is a small power with finite security capabilities and a pressing strategic problem in its neighbourhood.

But in a world of connectivity and geopolitical contestation, regional security dynamics cannot be compartmentalised. What occurs in Europe – notably the cascading consequences of Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine – matters to the security of Asia and the world. And what about developments in the Asia-centric maritime super region now known as the Indo-Pacific? These have their own implications for every nation with a stake in global stability, prosperity and a rules-based order, a system where the outcomes of differences among states not determined by power alone.

Already there have been hints of linkages between Finnish and Indo-Pacific security. In October 2023, the sabotage of an undersea cable in the Gulf of Finland, reportedly by the anchor of a Chinese cargo ship, raised concerns about Russia-China strategic partnership manifesting in unfriendly Chinese security activity in European waters. In December 2022, in a visit to Australia and New Zealand, Finland’s then Prime Minister Sanna Marin called for greater solidarity among democracies regardless of geographical distance. She warned against economic dependence on authoritarian power and urged diversification of supply chains and greater technology cooperation between European and Australasian partners. More recently, the Finnish government of Petteri Orpo, elected in 2023, has signalled a growing priority for defence and security in the nation’s international affairs. A narrow trade focus on relations with Asia is now a thing of the past.

Understanding why Finland needs a policy on the strategic tensions in the Indo-Pacific requires an outline of what these tensions are, how they originated, and how they relate to the globally-connected nature of that region. Much of that story is about China.

Three tropical cyclones on Indo-Pacific north of Australia. Cyclone Olwyn to the left on Indian Ocean approaching Western Australia, Cyclone Nathan in the middle nearing its first landfall on Queensland, and to the right Cyclone Pam nearing peak intensity on Pacific Ocean close to Vanuatu. The satellite image was taken on 11 March 2015 with NASA’s Suomi NPP satellite named after Finnish-American meteorologist Verner E. Suomi.
Photo: NASA

Until the 2010s, the term Indo-Pacific was little used in modern international affairs. Diplomats and scholars spoke of Asia or the Asia-Pacific. The Asia-Pacific concept, in particular, had become an orthodoxy in the late 20th century, as a way of explaining the commercial and security linkages between East Asia, North America and Oceania. At first, the Asia-Pacific articulated the connection between the economic growth of Japan and other East Asian ‘tigers’ and the need to keep the United States engaged in Asia with the end of the Cold War. Then, in the 1990s and 2000s, it became a guiding idea for cooperation among diverse Asian countries, with a central place for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and a major and seemingly constructive role for China.

But in reality, even by the start of this century, the Asia-Pacific idea was being supplanted by something larger and more inclusive but also more fluid and complex, painted in strategic shades of maritime grey: the Indo-Pacific. The official view in China may be uncomfortable with Indo-Pacific terminology – seeing it as privileging India and preferring the Beijing-centric label of ‘Belt and Road’. Yet the ironic fact is that China’s own expansion of economic interests, security presence and diplomatic influence – south and west and across the sea to Africa – has been a key driver of the modern Indo-Pacific era.

At its heart, the Indo-Pacific idea is about connectivity and contestation across two oceans, joining together the Indian and Pacific oceans as a single strategic theatre. This is a recognition that with the rise of China and India in particular, as great powers – outward-looking trading nations but also maritime military actors – the events and power relations in any one part of maritime Asia cannot be artificially quarantined.

Equally, because the sea lanes of those two oceans have become critical to global trade, energy supply and digital connectivity, what occurs there is every nation’s business. European nations are global stakeholders in the South China Sea and the straits and archipelagoes of Southeast Asia – the international waters at the geographic core of the Indo-Pacific.

Prime Ministers Marin and Albanese pose in park on the waterfront with Sydney Opera House on the adjacent shore. PM Albanese's dog lays on the lawn.
Prime Minister of Australia Anthony Albanese and then Prime Minister of Finland Sanna Marin in Sydney 2 December 2022.
Photo: Australian Government

The Indo-Pacific is multipolar and the centre of gravity for global economic and strategic weight. The future of the world will be decided here. It is a region defined by the competing (or sometimes cooperating) interests of many substantial countries, and not only the rivalry between the United States and China. Crude bipolarity is the narrative Beijing prefers to tell because it helps to legitimise the false argument that, if only America would depart Asian waters, all would be happy and peaceful. The reality is that rising Chinese power, authoritarian influence and coercion across the Indo-Pacific have brought friction with the interests and sovereignty of many countries: notable among them Japan, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Australia. And, of course, the most prominent and troubling potential flashpoint for major armed conflict in the Indo-Pacific is across the Taiwan Strait.

Beijing’s threatening rhetoric and military intimidation – incursions of aircraft, blockade-style naval exercises, missile barrages into the water – require all nations to take seriously the possibility that Xi Jinping means what he says: that China would be willing to risk major war in order to capture the self-ruled democratic island of Taiwan and end the freedom of its 23 million people.

Beijing’s claim on Taipei is contested: the Chinese Communist Party has never ruled Taiwan. Other nations’ diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China, rather than Taipei’s ‘Republic of China’, is not the same as allowing a peaceful status quo to be shattered through military aggression. Taiwanese democracy is a success story of good governance, affirming that there is nothing uniquely ‘Western’ about liberal democratic systems. It is also a celebrated cause for pro-democratic forces throughout much of the world, especially those with memories of authoritarian oppression, notably in Eastern Europe and Finland’s Baltic neighbourhood. There is a good case that helping Taiwan preserve its resilient democracy and deter Chinese aggression is in the interest of democracies everywhere.

In terms of global peace, security, prosperity and a rules-based order – priorities for small nation such as Finland – the consequence of a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be catastrophic, and of a greater magnitude than the impact of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, terrible though that is. The conflict would almost certainly engage the United States in defence of Taiwan, precipitating a hot war between the world’s two strongest nations. America’s failure to fight – or its defeat – would grievously undermine the credibility of US deterrence and alliance arrangements globally. American allies in the Indo-Pacific, particularly Japan, Australia and the Philippines, would be highly likely to support Washington in the conflict.

Strictly speaking, NATO treaty commitments may not be directly activated: it is a North Atlantic alliance after all. But NATO itself has been experimenting with Indo-Pacific partnerships (Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand). In cyber, space, intelligence, technology, resupply, logistics, diplomacy and the propaganda battle, it is impossible to imagine that Europe would somehow become neutral or inviolate ground. In any case, the economic impacts of conflict would affect Europe rapidly. A Chinese assault on Taiwan would greatly disrupt or even shut down commercial shipping across key Indo-Pacific sea lanes. For Europe as for everyone, massive investments and consular safety of citizens in China and Taiwan would be imperilled. Technology supply chains – especially around Taiwan’s indispensable role in manufacturing high-end semiconductors – would bend or break.  Washington’s military focus would turn profoundly to Asia. And this assumes conflict could be confined to below a nuclear threshold.

Photo taken from the US Frigate shows Chinese vessel sailing horizontally in front of US vessel in close proximity.
The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Chung-Hoon observes Chinese vessel PLA(N) LUYANG III DDG 132 execute maneuvers in an unsafe manner while conducting a routine south to north Taiwan Strait transit alongside the Halifax-class frigate HMCS Montreal (FFG 336), 3 June 2023.
Photo: U.S. Navy photo / Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Andre T. Richard

Taiwan is hardly the only point of risk in the Indo-Pacific chessboard. Tensions with escalatory potential exist between China and Japan in the East China Sea, between China and the multiple Southeast Asian claimants its forces bully in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, between China and India on their contested Himalayan border, and – in more of a grey zone, unmilitarised context – between China and Australia in the island nations of the South Pacific, where Beijing is expanding its influence and seeking a security presence. China’s Maritime Silk Road vision of infrastructure and influence across the waterways to Africa and the Middle East equates somewhat with longstanding American and Indian concerns that Beijing wants a ‘string of pearls’ – a chain of military bases and access points in the Indian Ocean, to protect its trade routes and attempt to dominate even that most global of oceans.

Even if the risk of major conflict is lesser in some of these other parts of the Indo-Pacific great game than in a Taiwan scenario, the principles at play are similar: questions about stability, peace and respect for international law and a rules-based order where force does not automatically prevail. In the South China Sea, the upholding of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including rights of freedom of navigation and innocent passage, should exercise the interest of all seafaring and trading nations – and of any smaller power than has a potential territorial difference with a larger one.

As many European nations along with the EU and in its own way NATO explore what a realistic Indo-Pacific strategy would look like, one important element is the ‘demonstration effect’ of how actions and outcomes in one theatre affect deterrence calculations in the other. In short, the best contribution Europe can make to peace and security in the Indo-Pacific is to prove that aggression does not succeed in Europe. The Ukraine war is the subject of close scrutiny in China and among all the forces that may be called on to deter an Indo-Pacific war. For their part, China and Russia see a connection of the theatres. Despite Putin’s savage miscalculation, Xi Jinping continues to support his fellow autocrat, just as Russia works with China to weaken the US-led alliance system in the Indo-Pacific and the influence of Washington and the West globally. Even more stark is North Korea’s munitions lifeline for the Russian war machine bombarding Ukraine.

Prime Minister of Australia Anthony Albanese, President of the United States Joe Biden and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Rishi Sunak deliver remarks on the AUKUS security partnership at Point Loma Naval Base in San Diego, California on 13 March 2023.
Photo: Official White House Photo / Hannah Foslien

Other ways European powers can contribute to stability in the Indo-Pacific is to use means other than military capability to help maintain a regional equilibrium, where the sovereignty of all nations is respected and the ability to resist great-power influence is strengthened. This includes, for instance, training and capacity-building of the militaries, coast guards and civil authorities, including in areas like maritime domain awareness, cyber security and countering disinformation. Education, technology and security governance are advantages European partners can bring, in coordination with resident Indo-Pacific powers such as Australia and Japan, to ensure that Southeast Asian countries can preserve their sovereignty and protect the regional commons.

Ultimately, there is also a domestic dimension to how Finland can usefully engage with the challenge of Indo-Pacific security. The parallel with Australia – the quintessential Indo-Pacific nation – can be instructive. These two countries may appear at first glance to have little in common in their strategic situation. Plainly, Finland has at its border Putin’s threatening Russia, and historic memory of direct Soviet aggression. Australia’s most frightening strategic moment – aggression but not invasion by imperial Japan in the 1940s – was less existential, and Canberra had a newfound American protector by its side. However, in recent years, Australia has experienced full-spectrum security frictions with China, from political interference, espionage and intimidation of the Chinese diaspora on its own soil, through to economic coercion, harassment of Australian warships and aircraft, and Beijing’s encroachments closer to Australian territory. Previously a complacent middle power unaccustomed to preparing for the worst, Australia has begun to improve its readiness for many scenarios of confrontation or conflict: getting serious about resilience. It has led the world, for instance, in excluding non-trusted (Chinese) vendors from its 5G networks, and in tightening its laws against foreign interference. Australian policy leaders know their country also needs to do more in preparing the population, the business community and civilian agencies for strategic shocks.

There would be much benefit in Australia and Finland studying each other’s experience of national security and preparedness. Even while Finland is adding NATO alliance membership to its traditions of self-reliance, Australia is recognising it needs to become stronger at home to augment its alliance with the United States. The author’s own professional experience in recent years has been to lead education courses to improve the security mindset of Australian government officials and parliamentarians – with some inspiration from the work of Finland’s National Defence Course. The Baltic may be a long way from the Indo-Pacific, but it is time for us all to study the cross-currents.

Writer

Professor Rory Medcalf is Head of the National Security College at the Australian National University in Canberra. He is a member of the Scientific Advisory Council of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. He is known globally for his foundational work on the Indo-Pacific strategic concept, as set out in his book Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World’s Pivotal Region.

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